[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] >> the committee will come to order. we appreciate you being here to answer questions. it is my understanding having worked with both sides and my understanding from those who i have yet to speak with that should the panel run short, that is members not be allowed to answer all the questions we have here today, that you both will personally agree to come back and participate in another hearing as a follow-up. we will call this part 1 of part 1 of this hearing. expect that the two of you would also be able to atte that second hearing. i hope and expect that you will be able to attend the second hearing. is that your understanding of how we will proceed? >> mr. chairman, yes, it is.

yes, mr. . >> as long as we have the ranking member here and there's an understanding of how that will proceed, we will proceed. mr. lee kair, assistant of add mintray tear for security options and rob kin kane is assistant administrator for security technology. do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give it is the truth, nothing but the truth? let the record reflect they answer in the affirmative. we ask is to all you to take five minutes for your opening statements. adhere to the red light that appears before you. there's some leeway with that. keep your comments to five minutes, and you can submit any additional testimony you cannot

give verbally. at this time, we week news first m. kane for five minutes. >> good afternoon. we appreciate the opportunity to appear before you tday to discuss the transportation security administration's risk base driven approach to aviation security and specifically the use of advanced imaging technology. as a chief technology officer, i will focus on the aspects and lee will discuss the human aspect. bere going into detail, the technology is vital to the nation's ability to keep travelers safe in the 9/11 world. we face a determined enemy bent on our way of life. they arrested a man planning an attack on the dc subway system and a young saw disrespectful frankly -- saudi man was arrested.

whether it was a failed attack in 2009, the plot in october, or the intelligence plots we see every day, al-qaeda and intelligence groups continue to target our system. we have to detect today's threat, not yesterday's. we have a able system that works in several measures. one aspect of the check point is what we're hear to discuss today. mr. chairman, well hidden devices are among the gravest threat to security. while there's no sell veer bullet, this gives us the best opportunity to detect the threats. we piloted the technology in early 2007 knowing of these threats. following analysis, we employed the technology nationwide. after the christmas day attack, we accelerated it. we know that well-concealed

devices like those used in 2009 are detected by ait. up to the image operator to recognize the anomaly. beyond effectiveness there's two issues to address. ait units in airports cannot store, print, or transmit images. it requires different software to make this a possibility. the officer reviewing the picture does not see the passenger. ait does not produce photographic quality images to permit personal identification. we are now testing other detection software to further enhance privacy by eliminating passenger's specific images and highlighting the anomalies on a outline. this provides the se detection capability of previous versions of the imaging technology. passengers appreciate it. on safety, this technology is safe tar all passengers and

employees. the radiation from back scatter machines has been independently confirmed by the food and drug adminiration, standards and technology, john hopkins university, and the u. army among others. all this testing confirmed that the radiation dose is well within established standards. they are incapable of producing the energy required to generate radiation at a level to exceed the established standards. fail safe mechanisms are up stalled to shut the machines down should they begin operating in unexpected ways. multiple tests occur on each individual uni before it is used to screen passengers. ongoing tests goes on every unit to confirm safe continued operation. additional testing is tested if a machine is relocated. they are required to notify fda and tsa if they have radiation levels above the standard. we committed to all radiation tests online so the public can

see for themselves if their home airports have safe technology. while reviewing older reports, there were errors in the contractor's recordkeeping. we are taking steps to ensure they are not repeating including testing those where they are an error, retraining the work force. they are doing those surveys, extending the evaluation of the protocols and having increased expertise on our own tsa experts review the surveys. these steps enhance our ability to ensure all technology is safe. with that, i turn it over to lee. >> thank you. i recognize mr. kair for five minutes. >> good afternoon and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today regarding the transportation security administration's use of imaging technology at airport security check points. as stated, current intelligence reminds us that commercial

aviation remains a top terrorist target. on christmas day, farouk attempted to blow up a plane with a device that would not and could not be discovered by a metal detector. our dedicated adversaries is dependent upon our ability to have the latest technologies and procedures. as head of the security operations, overseeing the work of the front line security employees, i assure you our nearly 50,000 officers and managers at over 450 airports nationwide are dedicated to our important security mission. every day tsa screens nearly 2 million passengers to assure they arrive safely. there's a variety of safety teaks to ensure the transportation systems are secure including advanced imaging technology. while there's no silver bullet with aviation security, a

combination with our check point procedures and the work of the dedicated work force provides us with the best tools to detect threats. passengers may request alternate screening. as we deploy technology, tsa evolves pat down procedures as well as mitigate threats. there are a few things to clarify regarding the pat down procedures. first, only a small percentage of pasngers require a pat down during the secretary screening process. they are conducted by same gender officers and all passengers have the right to request private screening at any time during the process. anything, any passenger may choose to be accompanied by an individual of their choosing such as a parent, guardian, or traveling companion throughout the process. while it is necessary to ensure that all passengers are properly reened, tsa is sensitive to passenger needs.

for example, our officers are trained to work with parents and passengers with special needs to ensure a respectful screening process for the entire family. additionally, tsa's office of civil rights and liberties maintains a coalition of more than 70 disability related groups who partner with tsa to inform the check point screening procedures including the use of advanced imaging technology. we continue to work closely with these groups to ensure we are constantly improving the training we provide to the officers which ultimately enhances the passengers' experience. while we continue to work with the stake holders and partners, we are dead kitted to -- dedicated to inform the traveling public regarding the use of technoloes such as ait and our procedures. we want to ensure the traveling public understanding the screening process while otecting the information terroristsould use in an attempt to circumvent screening protocols. we rked with parters to post

gns in the airport, ait, website, and via press conferences and social networks platforms. through this, tsa reached millions of individuals nationwide to inform them about airport security policies and procedures. additionally, tsa is committed to answering questions and receiving feedback from the public regarding their screening experience. to achieve this, we utilize a number of communication tools including the tsa accountant center, talk to tsa web feedback tool, local customer service managers, and up put on the tsa blog among other avenues. tsa is committed to building upon best practices to mitigate risk and make the transportation system as safe as possible. earlier this month, administrator outline the a vision for the future of airport security screenings as we develop additional risk-based initiatives at shift away from a one size fits all approach from airport check points.

tsa anticipates this approach will enable tsa to better focus resources while enhancing the passenger experience. we want to thank the subcommittee for holding this hear on tsa's use of advanced imaging technology and for its work in overseeing the agency's efforts to ensure the transportation security. we are pleased to answer any questions you might have. >> thank you. i'll now recognize myself for five minutes. we have a great need in this country to secure aircraft and transportation in general. the threat is real. let there be no mistake from anybody anywhere that the threat is very real. i appreciate the good hard work that the tens of thousands of agents do. most are trying to do a good job, working hard, placed in a difficult situation. in fact, # a lot of them who siped upo do this didn't envision they would be involved in pat downs and ding things

they were not anticipating to do. i appreciate both of you in your degree of participation with public service. mr. kane, for instance, 20 years in the coast guard and whatnot, we appreciate that. nevertheless, i do and am very frustrated from the lack of candor coming from the security administration. the tsa has a notorious reputation of doing things differently than what they say. that's not an attack of you two. i want to no at the beginning it is not a direct criticis on any one of you personally, but given that you're sitting here, an i'm glad you are, and we're going to have this discussion, i just want to note that it is our role and responsibility to make sure that we improve security and still protect people with their fourth amendment rights, that we min minimize the nature in which this technology is deployed, not just the technology, but the pat downs as

well. with that said, i want to start to dive in here a little deeper on the machines and start, for instance, start with you, mr. kane. these machines as i understand it were built to the specifications; react? >> yes, mr. chairman. >> yet i have heard "the imaging technology we use cannot store, export, print, or transport images." is that true? >> the machines in the airports cannot store, transmit images. the software packages on the machines does not allow that in the airport. we have machines in the testing environment where we do have that capability. >> same machines though right? >> same machines hardware wise. >> same machines. >> hardware wise. >> you just -- my understanding, and i'm looking at the freedom of

information act put out there in the specifications put out. let me read a few things. enabling and disabling picture filter shall be modified by user shall be defined by the user's access. when in test mode, the whole body imaging machine, the wbi, allows exporting the image data in realtime, shall provide secure means of high speed transfer of image data, shall allow exporting of image data raw and reconstructed. did i misread anything here? is that accurate? >> i believe you are referring to probably a prior specification, some of which we've cleaned up in subsequent engineering change proposals to make sure the test modes are separate. you referenced a test mode. that mode does not exist in the airport environment. those machines have a different software package. >>ou said the same machines have those capabilities.

the network, each of them are built with a quote on quote network interface with an ether net interface connection. the network interface is con figured with an ip address that suggests it's transferring images, is it not? >> none of the machines today are networked. that capability is in the hard -- are not in the hardware of that machine. >> they have the capability of doing it, and you actually do capture and transmit images; right? think about this. from the stand point of the fact someone goes through the machine, capture the image, it's transferred into another room. that image appears on the screen. >> that's correct. >> how is that not capturing or transmitting the image? >> the point is we don't save the image or transmit them. that's the same part of the meres and that review station is part of that the advanced imaging technology machine, and, of course, there's a display

monitor on the machine to look at the image to identify anomalies to be resolved. >> under oath, i want to ask you both, do you transmit images that you have captured in airports ever? have you done that? >> captured in airportings, i'm completely uni ware of having done that. i would say no under oath we do not tramit images from the airport. >> have you ever done that? >> i'm unaware of us doing that. >> i'm uni ware, sir. >> you have in your specifications that you have to have these capabilities. why was that in there in the first place? >> clearly, when we developed in type of technology like any other piece of technology we have, we have to do extensive testing, do extensive training to be able to deploy thos machines, therefore, we have the capabilityn those machines to operate in the test mode, to

capture images, to be to transmit images to other machines in the networks we use in testing facilities we have that capability. we don't have that capability in the airports. we separated that capability completely out from anything that's in the airport, and the other piece we have images we use that were taken from volunteers and typically those are paid volunteers that we use the testing processes to capture the images. >> what about the so-called level z access? imaibilitys under quote on quote level z access, enable and disable image filters, export raw image data in test mode, identify level access capabilities, down load data. how many people have user access level z capability? >> that's a question for mr. kane. >> sorry. >> mr. chairman, i'm in the sure of the exact number, but i'd like to saythe specifications to make sure we give greater confidence to

people we we not doing the things people are talking about, we removed the capabilities from th access. those are maintenance technicians and people inmy lab have that. >> can you provide provide this committee the e-mail or the paperwork that would verify you changed that and when it was changed? >> mr. chairman, i certainly will do that for the record. >> when i see under the tsa website, "the image cannot be stored, transz mitted or printed and deleted once viewed." that's false right? it has that capability. >> it's not a matter of flipping a switch. the software on the airport machines does not allow that capability in the airport. the software in our testing machines is a separate software and has that capality in our labs. >> has it ever had that capability? >> in those initial, first, i

believe 47 that we rolled out, that capability was on the machines to flip that switch, that z level acces that you're referring to. we recognize we wanted to change that, and we made a change in the airports and retrofitted it to the machines in the airport. >> the committee would appreciate that paperwork. my apologies, i did not realize how far over time i was. i will now recognize the gentleman from minnesota for five minutes or more if you'd like. >> thank you. mr. chairman, i think it's important to get the questions answered that you need answered. i have no objection to the time. let me popped this to death to be clear. i'm reading the requirements on sensitive security information, and it says tsa policy dictates the passenger privacy is maintained and protected during passenger screening. to ensure the passenger's safeguds systems prohibit the

storage and exporting of images during normal screening operations. while not used for normal operation, t capability to capture images of nonpassengers or training in evaluation purposes is needed. to ensure the image capturin remain private, there's two distinct modes, screening mode and test mode. during screen mode, they are prohibited from passenger data including tsp. during test mode, they are not capable of conducting passenger screeng. is that accurate to you? >> yes, congressman. >> okay. so what we need to do is give assurances to people who are doubtful on that. how do you suggest we do that? >> it's very difficult times to do that. we talked about it. we offered up the specifications, made some of those changes you referred to, changed the specifications to

make iterate the machines, put out an impact on how we are trying to operate the machines and stightforward with the public with the sign nag and the other messaging mechanisms to make it clear on how we have the data. >> it is the ability to do the things you said obtained in the cast ware opposed to the hardware? >> at one time you could flip a switch, but we separated that kate, and the operate machines don't have that ability. >> if you want to go to the airport, the software at any begin airport is disabling all the problems he has or concerns that he has? does not allow them in >> it's difficult to see that at the airport from a nonexpert, but we

can -- >> take an expert with him? on that? okay. do the millimeter wave scanners as effective or more effective? >> i can't talk about the specific requirements and capabilities in open hearing. >> you can't tell me whether or not they are effective as the others? >> so what i would say is both met our specifications, so we have specifications we put out and both met the specifications in very near similar levels, and they flipped a bit depending where you used them. >> i mean, i don't accept your answer that you can't tell us in open session, but i will for the moment because the basic point is it's interchangeable and the tsa is satisfied with whatever machine is at a begin airport that it's doing the job you wanted done? >> that's fair to say, congressman. >> now, the only reason you don't go just to the wave scanner where there's no issue

at all with regard to radiation, is the tsa says it is so low that it's not a problem? >> that's one the reasons. it is very safe technology, and it's very, very low radiation as we tested independently many times, but the other is it is usefulor multiple technologies. as we talked about, we need to address the threat. having a number of people working on the problem of addressing the threat is useful to us. having competition in the marketplace where we are the primary buyer in the world of technologies useful to us as well. >> i'm all about competition on that as the f136 debate will cft, but the fact of the matter is if you thought it was a risk of danger, you take the chance of anomalies than take the chance with the competitor. >> we think the technology is very safe, yes. >> will you make available to the public your evaluation studies and make the equipment available for up dependent

testing? >> we've never made the equipment available for independent testing. that would expose it to a lot of public information that we woul't share publicly in tes of its capabilities. >> you don't think there's a way to do that and not expose it? it's done all the time. >> radiation wise, we have done that with independent value day tores, john hopkins and standards and technology just making available to the public to look at those machines, no, we wouldn't be able to do that. >> but other than making it generally available to the public, you would make it availability to other up dependent sources qualified make an evaluation? you would do it if set up appropriately? >> yes, sir. >> okay. do you know whether or not the materials that were used by the shoe bomber and the underwear boer or whatever you call them could have been detected by the ait machines? >> what ait does is detect

anomalies on the body. those are anomalies to the body, so, yes, it detects those materials. we have found, you know, tested against similar types of mateals in the labs and certainly on the operation in the day day-to-day use. there's thins similar to those types of materials as well. >> one the witnesses testified that t department of homeland security and tsa basically funded a national academy of sciences report where it made a recommendation for evaluating the effectiveness of all initiatives in a systematic way and then had a process out there. do you follow that prosays when evaluating the different techniques? >> i think if you talk about the process we use for developing our technologies, yes, we use a systematic process in doing that. >> do you use the one from the national academy of sciences? >> the one from the department

of homeland security. >> do you know how that measures up to the congress recommendations? >> i don't. >> can you get that for the record for us? >> certainly. >> how your policy and standards and evaluation process lines up with the national academy of sciences in the 2008 report paid for by the homelandecurity and tsa. >> yes, sir. >> tnk you vermuch, i yield back, mr. chairman. >> chair now recognizes the gentleman from texas for five minutes. >> thank you very much. y'l, in response to privacy concerns you implemented the pat down search as well as the secondary pat down search for ano , ma'am -- anomalies. you could do searches at the airport and pat downs are legal, limited in its intrusiveness as it is consistent with satisfactory of the administrative need that justifies it. limited and intrusiveness is key

there. look at the slides we've got up here. i'm concerned that these -- these are not even the secretary pat downs, but the primary pat downs. this is a child, another child. ere are people who would go to jail touching a child like this. do y think these are the least intrusive means you can come up with to ensure security? >> sir, we actually sit every morning in an intelligence brief where we learn what is coming at us from our attackers, and what is evident to us is that the, those that wish to do us harm are very willing to use

techniques which go against our social norms and try to use things that will use our process against us, and that was proven out actually in flight 253 with the plement of a bomb that used all nonmetallic components, and so we have done extensive testing in whattechniques we can use in order to be able to detect items like that using process and technology so that we can mitigate that threat while also being as conscious as possible about the passengers experience coming through as well as allowing passengers to expeditiously -- >> you indicated in your testimony that only a small percentage of passengers have undergone a secondary screening. i've had the misphenomenonture of -- misfortune of being one of those passengers. i was taken into a private room without the option of having

anyone accompanied my. i was thoroughly searched. a rescran would have avoted that. isn't that less intrusive when there's five anomalies detected on my body? >> without getting into the sense of security part of when we do what type of screening, when we have an anomaly in a sensitive area, we do want to make se that we properly screen that area using a pat down. any passenger is authorized to have a companion in tt private screening room with them, and we use whatever technique we can. >> i would have rather had this happen in the sun. despite as embrassing as it was, i preferred to stand out there and let the rest of the people at the airport see what i was subjected to.

i'm concerned also about the safety of your hard working tsa officers. why do none of the officers that work around the x-ray machines in particular not wear the same safety badges that anybody who works at a hospital is required to wear? this seems like a low-cost way to ensure the safety of the people working for you. >> congressman, these are different, and they are ry, very low levels of radiation used by these machines, and they are well within public use limits. there are national standards for implementing a program that you're referring to, and we are well, well below any of those leveling that cause us to put the radiation badges on the workers. >> i can understand why you're not willing to open up the entire software process to peer review, but would you be willing to allow up dependent agencies or independent science community to test the amount of radiation

that these machines emit? >> sir, we have done a number of independent tests, and we have ongoing independent tests for all of these machines in the airports. john hopkins did the study on the back scanner technology as an independent body. the army's public health command comes into airports. they look at our radiating machines in airports, and they use test and survey methods and they've done extensive testing on the machines. clearly, and consistently they show very, very low levels of radiation. >> i see the time expired. i'll wait around for the next round of question. i have another page. >> thank you, the gentleman yields back. i now recognize the gentleman from maryland -- or illinois? >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks for being here. how many of these maches are in place now? >> there are nearly 500 in

airports in 78 different airports. >> how many do you need if u're goingo use them at every location and every gate? >> we're working through what that would be. some depends on the final capability of the machines especially with this automated targeted software we bought. you get more people through those. that's somewhere less than 1800, but the number will be something less than that. we have around 2 200 airport leap -- lanes in the country. >> is there a concern you have? if those were all in place, with the new technology and the time to get through, it would not change the time it takes to get x number of people through o'hair operate a day? >> congressman, we arecepstive to that -- sensitive to that.

the final number depends on the technology. right now you see it in an airport sitting in a walk through detector to alleviate that concern. we won't cause that to be the impact at the check points. >> is there a projected time frame to have these all in place? a range? >> i can tell you that we have nearly 500 in the airports today, 500 in the president's fiscal year budget request hothe fiscal year plays out, we'll see, but we think there's 500 within the level and fiscal year 12 question is for 275 more additional machines. >> you mentioned the new capabilities and technologies that would be more generic in terms of what body images are shown? >> yes, you see at the machine itself a generic outline, same

for everyone, and you just see that, and the anomalies show up on the that. th allows to do the resolution at the machine to a very limited pat down or targeted pat down. if i keep m blackberry in the pocket, and the officer has to resolve that alarm there in my pocket. >> the reason i'm asking if it seems like it's a reasonable period of time before the technology is available, you want to start shifting to those right away before you purchase 2200 of them. >> that technology will be available and stated a number of times we expect the next procurement to have that capability. >> thank you. i yield back. >> earlier, i heard exactly what you said, i want to make sure. have any of these machines transmitted, have you e-mailed, have you sent anything back to the head quarters, and i believe

your awer to that was you were unaware of any; right? >> correct. >> why isn't the answer to that no? it doesn't even have the capability. that gives m a pause to think about that, and you came to the conclusion, well, not that i'm aware of in't definitive as no, it's not even capable of doing it. it's like if i said can your airplane, did you fly to new york in the airplane? no, it can't fly. >> i can tell you no authoritatively since we rolled them out in airports. i was no involved with the program from inception, i don't know what occurred earlier in the programs' inception. i'm virtually for certain, but i wasn't in the airports and how they were used in the airports, but tsa says we vice president.

i just can't say before my time there. >> i appreciate that, but just because you're on the record, i find the inconsistency between the record. i won't take the time of this committee, but that is the concern. instead of hearing a definitive no, it's not capable, i read specifications, ip address, ether net, it basically has the capabilities, and that's the challenge. i've taken this gentleman's time. i yield back my time and recognizthe gentleman from maryland for five minutes. >> chairman, i just noted you all stopped the clock for about two or three minutes, so did you know that? let me just say, gentlemen, you all have a very tough job. you have a very, very tough b. you were not herearlier when i said that.

you got to protect the public. at the same time, you have to make sure you have a fair balance so that you're not intruding into people's lives unreasonably and their bodies, and that's a tough one, and as i listen to all of what has been said so far, there has been an overhanging at this hearing, and i think with the chairman's statement just now, there is a very, very significant shadow hanging over tsa, and that is clearly that and it goes to a five letter word, "trust." and you all, i mean, you know, when i listen to all of discussions, you all, there's a

lot of information you cannot divulge, and i'm no intelligence expert, but i would imagine part of the problem is you don't want to let people know what certain things are happening with these machines so that they can get around them i guess, a i right? does that make sense? >> yes, sir. >> on the other hand, you have a congress who whichments to -- wants to know and the public wants to know, and that's kind of a tough situation, and i guess what i want to get to is, you know, i want to have that trust. i want to believe that just like members of congress raised their hand and swear to protect the people we represent, that you all go in there every day trying to figure out how you can best protect every single person that

uses our air ways, and so how would you all suggest begin all that i -- given all that i just said and what you know that we establish, get that trust back, you know? because apparently, and, you know, the more i think about it, it's so easy to lose the trust when you can't give up so much information, when you got millions of opportunities for something to go wrong, but how do we get back there because that's what it's all about. i mean, first of all, you have have the trust, but there's another piece of this. you've got to do things in a way that is least intrusive, but there has to be a level of trust for people to believe that you're doing it in the least up trucive way -- intrusive way, so help me with

that. >> mr. congressman, all i can say is when you look back at previous attacks even since 9/11, our adversary does look for processes or prohibited items which are items whichre not prohitted at the time such as 9/11, they used an attempt not prohibited at the time or look at what our process is and try to use the process against us such as the richard reed shoe bomb. they recognized at the time that using a nonmetallic improvised explosive device through a meal detector was a vital way of going through. we have to look every day what are we seeing from a threat perspective and trying to put processes or technology in place to avoid that type of a risk or threat, and at e same time be able to communicate with the traveling public so they know what to expect when they come to

the check point. it is a balancing agent we have to balance every day, and it boils down to having a very active dialogue with the american public. we use a variety of ways to do that incoming, you know -- including, you know, pretty rebust dialogue on the internet. we have an award winning blog where we encourage the american people to have that discussion with them about why it is we are doing what it is we do every day, and we want to make sure that the traveling public is able to navigate our screening process. >> out of time, but i wanted to ask you this. when the heard the representative earlier testify ring one of the things she talk about is training, and there seemed to be, you know, i think part of trust too is that people feel that they are treated with respect, that they may be going through a difficulty, but somebody hears them, understands them, somebody has empathy. i think that goes a long ways towards trust also, and i just

comment and my time is up. >> yes, sir, i couldn'tgree with you more on that. we imp size the -- emphasize to the officers, wh are some of the most trained and tested of any profession out there. one of the things we emphasize with the officers is proper communication to deescalate the traveling process, just traveling much less screening is a stressful proposition for a family going through. our officers are trained and for the most part do a good job of deescalating stresses. we retrained our entire work force about two and a half years ago to emphasize customer service as well as security because the two actually go hand own hand. we have another training initiative this year to get at that same exact issue of good communication that deregulates stress to a system in getting through -- it's a partnersh with the american public where we want them to help us in the screening process going through

our check points. >> gentleman yields back. we recognize the chairman of the overall committee from california for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you for your patience in getting through a long day. this is an important panel. we waited for you two because this committee has serious doubts about the effectiveness and deficiency and authority for some of the thingsou're doing. i think that's pretty clear. the chairman is particularly interested in the full body scanners. i'm interested in the overall process, so as someone who was here on 9/11 and remembers president george w. bush telling us it wouldn't change america, i'm concerned that it has. you represent 50,000 well-meaning people. i debate well-trained because your rnover is still pretty darn high and it's hard to have that many new people and say they are well-trained. every time i go through security i see training.

that's a good thing, but i see the need for training every time i go through. let me give you something other than full body scanner for relief. i fly more than 40 round trips a year plus overseas trip. for more than six years i carried in my carry on bag gouge and every flight a pair of folding scissors. that pair of scissors was taken away two weeks ago. that pair of folding scissors, if you open them up has one inch of blade times two, and it's overall length is two inches. i have researched and can want find a basis for taking that away. do you have an explanation for that kind of subjectivity? were they wrong -- 40 times two is 80. you know, 320 times they were wrong, or right one time?

>> we did an analysis on the prohibited items list on november 2005, that time frame with a risk-based analysis. >> i remember my tooth being taken away after liqui were a problem in the british situation. you didn't have an answer. you took them away and then made the answer 3 ounces. the scissors, are they prohibited? >> during that analysis in november 2005, that time frame, we changed theprohibited items list, and the sis sore of a length less than four inches are not prohibited. i don't have an explanation why they would have been removed two weeks ago. >> eight weeks earlier i had a .12 millimeter taken away. it was five inches long. can you explain that one? >> small tools were another piece of the analysis that was done, and there is some discretion on tools where if it

could be used as a bludgeon, it's prohibited. if it's a normal tool less than 7 inches, it's allowable. all that information is up on tsa.gov. >> oh, i went there, but when you say you've got to be kidding, you get threatened. you get people who make it very clear they are law enforcement, so i'moncerned about something. i'm concerned that some people think less than 5 inch.12 millimeter open end box wrench is a bludgeoning tool and a point and cutting and two inches of little rest of the scissors are somehow dangerous, but they only do it very infrequently. please, as a guy with a morcycle, don't ask me to explain why i had a 12

millimeter in a box from the wrong coast, but these things happen. you don't have a consistent system to test. day, you're saying we are safer, well, in fact, only a fraction of the people are going through the full body scanners and the full scanners are repeatedly false positiving. suspect that true? isn't it true that my statement is fair that only a fraction of people go through them with huge false pos sieves today? -- positives today? >> today, only a fraction of the people go through them. they have false positives, not a huge number of false pitives. >> how about in san diego, it's every fifth person that goes through gets a secondary. >> that's possible. >> 20% is not huge, but close enough to huge if you're one the people getting a pat down. you heard testimony here tread that in fact, low level x-ray is long standing to be a problem. what assurance do we have here

today that you're not going to be the next situation in which you say, well, it's not a problem, but members on the day who go back and forth across this country literally 50 round trips a year are not getting overexposed if in fact you implement full them this procedure. >> the machines have been tested repeatedly to show how safe they are and independently how safe they are, tested against standards that have a host of perts on them, and they set those standards that we work towards. we're well below the standards for this technology, the back scanr in particular that you're referring to. >> i'm referring to people involuntarily getting x-rays or forcedo a secondary because they said, no, i don't want to. the trusted traveler, granted it's bankrupt, but that

contributes to the question year after year after year, each time you find out what you didn't know which right now includes you can't detec a bomb sown into a human being, and as a result, you are not going to pick up a bomber willing to have surgery to plant explosives under their skin. th's been said here and well adopted here today. -- well-documented here today. would you please report back to the committee the following: earlier today it was in the opening of mr. kair's opening statement, you talked about what people can have and not have in the consistent. i go through those check points all over the country regularly. what i don't see is i don't see anything that says here is a traveler's right. you have a right to a private pat. you have a right -- i know i'm over, but a lot of us have.

i've seen tsa people traveling with another person to stand back, go over there. they are denying what you said was a right here today, and i hold you post the tsa to post that i have a rightto have my spouse, you have a right to have your child or whatever with you during any secondary and not be told they must go over there, stand over there, you will be arrested if you don't move away. the exact opposite happened in the experience of thousands of travelers. will you agree to post so travelers know that your tsa people are wrong if they try to say stand back, youcan't be there. >> sir, i believe the description about, you know, being able to have a traveling companion or family member with you particularly in the private screening area is up on the website. >> website doesn't make it. >> we will need to move on

here. >> will you commit it's available to the public at the point in which theyare being told that they cannot have that person with them? >> part of the challenge that we have is that sigh nag, you know, we run into having too many sipes -- signs out there, so having a posting is difficult for us because there's requirements. >> the chair recognizes that as a no. if you want to add testimony, this is the problem with trying to fit this in. about to be called for votes. it is the policy to recognize those who s on the subcommittee first ring so i'm going to recognize the chairman of the transportation committee, full member of ts committee and subcommittee first. >> okay, we -- have we bought 250 of the rapid scan scapers? is that - scanners, is that purchased or

being purchased; is that correct? >> that's correct, congressman. >> what's the estimatedost of that equipment? >> all told for the equipment purchase so far is around $122 million for both. >> l3, did the former secretary chair off talks or communicate wi either of you two? >> no, congress mapp, he did not. no, for me too. >> can you provide to the committee records of communications between those involved and the acquisition of the equipment? >> i'm not sure how to locate records. there was no one in tsa involved with him in the axis of the qiement -- acquisition of the equipment. >> can you provide the committee, can you check the records of representatives of, what is it l3 that you purchased that equipment from?

>> i'm sorry? >> the equipment was purchased, rapid scan and millimeter wave. i'm interested in finding out the context of the former secretary with tsa either prior to, during, or at some time of the acquisition, can you check your records? >> congressman, we can do that. i can tell you who was not involved in the acquisition of the machines any time after being secretary at least and clearly as oversight of the department, there would have been involvement before that. >> allight. we had actually the back scanner is nothing new. i remember five years ago we had a stick devices that you could deploy or software that would give you stick image rather than the full body scan rchg --

is that correct? are you aware? >> no, i'm not. >> i'm not. >> you're now testing that? >> the automated target software with the generic outline of a person. >> when do you expect those tests to be finished? >> we have them on the millimeter wave, the l3 machines in the airports today. they will finish up with the specific testing on those by the end of this month. >> okay. >> with a 45-60 day -- >> i can't believe it because five years ag that software was avaible, so we didn't have -- objections were raised five years ago, and we were told that technology was available. you have testing in your testimony, testing began in 2007 incoming testing of eval-- including testing of evaluation

of airports. when did you first notify congress you were going to deploy the equipment and it was fully tested? >> i'm not sure there was a specific time frame that we did that, congressman. i know in our budget request when we requested the machines and funding for them -- >> denied evaluation of testing at those airports? >> provided very substantial briefings and -- >> that was after the deployment? at least to my staff. >> that's possible, congressman. i don't know that we came up in advance of the point to everyone on the hill. >> are you aware of the latest testing of the equipment that gao conducted in december? we're aware of gao's testing as well as the other ongoing testing. >> do you feel that, again, what

this remind me of is the puffers, the failure rate was totally unacceptable. would you concur with that evaluation? >> i think we look at different types of testing and we think the machines are effectiveness the types of threats we are looking at. we do daily testing in airports across the country. >> that's your self-testing. have you -- you have been briefed by gao on their testing? >> yes, i have. >> and you find that acceptable level of performance? >> i'd like to think we can perform very well at 100%. >> do you find the level of failure acceptable that gao reported now that you have the equipment in place? >> so the specific number i think -- >> well, first of all ring we're not talking numbers because it's classified, but the failureas been pronounc.

mr. pistol said it was, that gao was clever. do you feel that, again, having reviewed this, is that a failure rate that's acceptable? >> we spent, a quarter of a billion dollars on deploying this equipment and staffing it, and i've had it tested, and to , it'sot acceptable. >> i would like to see us do better. >> if we could reveal the failure rate, the american public would be outraged at that expenditure. it seems you opted for a sort of popularity poll. you said that 80% of the people do not object to accepted the use of that technology even though it doesn't work, so that's the basis on which we deploy it, expensive screening

technology. >> no, congressman. that's a partial basis, but the other testing in the labs, field, and airports every day -- >> well the public may accept it, but i will not. thank you, and i yield back. . . >> i appreciate the public and those who have traveled here to do this. nevertheless, we will continue this hearing at a date to be

determined. we stand in recess, thank you. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2011] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]